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Obfuscating Kotlin code with ProGuard

2019-10-21T00:00:00Z

Kotlin + Proguard = fun

Obfuscating code is the process of modifying source code or build output in order to make it harder for humans to understand. It’s often employed as a tactic to deter reverse engineering of commercial applications or libraries when you have no choice but to ship binaries or byte code. For Android apps, ProGuard is part of the default toolchain and obfuscation is usually only a config switch away.

I was recently working on an Android library written in Kotlin that my client wanted obfuscated to try and protect some of their trade secrets that were included. Not a problem, I thought: it’s just a few lines of ProGuard config and we’re away. Four hours and lots of hair pulling later I finally got it working…

If at first you don’t succeed…

At first it seemed like ProGuard was refusing to obfuscate any class with a keep rule. With a simple test class:

class Test {

    private val secret = 123
    var name = "Chris"

    fun greet() {
        println("Hi $name! Enter a number: ")
        readLine()?.let { guess(it.toInt()) }
    }

    private fun guess(attempt: Int) = println(
        if (attempt == secret) {
            "Correct!"
        } else {
            "Nope!"
        }
    )

}

And a ProGuard rule of:

-keep public class Test {
    public void greet();
}

I expected that the Test class and the greet method would remain, but both fields and the guess method would be obfuscated. When I built the project and opened the class from Android Studio’s APK inspector I was disappointed:

public final class Test public constructor() {
    public final var name: kotlin.String /* compiled code */

    private final val secret: kotlin.Int /* compiled code */

    public final fun greet(): kotlin.Unit { /* compiled code */ }

    private final fun guess(attempt: kotlin.Int): kotlin.Unit { /* compiled code */ }
}

Having your secret sauce in a field labelled “secret” isn’t exactly the level of obfuscation I was hoping for. ProGuard has lots of knobs that you can twist to affect what it keeps and what it renames, but all the incantations of -keep, -keepmembernames, -allowobfuscation, and so on, that I could come up with either resulted in the class completely vanishing (because it wasn’t kept) or showing up with all its symbols intact.

There are lots of useful Stack Overflow posts describing how to obfuscate a single method, or keep a single method and obfuscate the rest, but nothing I tried seemed to make a difference. I’m not the biggest fan of ProGuard, but I’ve used it enough before to know that it’s not usually that hard to make it submit to your demands. Obviously something else was going on.

… Maybe you’re solving the wrong problem

My next thought was that perhaps Android Studio was doing something clever like reading the ProGuard mapping file and automatically deobfuscating the output for me. Looking at the mapping file it seems that ProGuard has indeed decided to rename some things:

Test -> Test:
    int secret -> a
    java.lang.String name -> b
    void greet() -> greet
    void <init>() -> <init>

The obvious solution is to look at the class file in something less smart than Android Studio. A couple of unzips later and I could do a quick test to see if the original names were still present:

$ strings Test.class | grep secret
secret

The problem is evidently not with Android Studio, as secret shouldn’t end up in the class file at all: it should have been entirely replaced with a like the mapping file says. The output from javap -p doesn’t show any hint of the original names, however:

$ javap -p Test
public final class Test {
  private final int a;
  private java.lang.String b;
  public final void greet();
  public Test();
}

But, given the names show up in strings, they must be kicking around somewhere. None of the various outputs from javap helped until I hit -verbose. Right at the end of the class is:

RuntimeVisibleAnnotations:
  0: #58(#84=[I#2,I#2,I#4],#69=[I#2,I#1,I#3],#81=I#2,#70=[s#40],#71=[s#55,s#39,s#43,s#85,s#39,s#72,s#42,s#91,s#47,s#90,s#39,s#73,s#39,s#74,s#67,s#83])
    kotlin.Metadata(
      mv=[1,1,15]
      bv=[1,0,3]
      k=1
      d1=["\u0000\"\n\u0002\u0018\u0002\n\u0002\u0010\u0000\n\u0002\b\u0002\n\u0002\u0010\u000e\n\u0002\b\u0005\n\u0002\u0010\b\n\u0000\n\u0002\u0010\u0002\n\u0002\b\u0003\u0018\u00002\u00020\u0001B\u0005¢\u0006\u0002\u0010\u0002J\u0006\u0010\u000b\u001a\u00020\fJ\u0010\u0010\r\u001a\u00020\f2\u0006\u0010\u000e\u001a\u00020\nH\u0002R\u001a\u0010\u0003\u001a\u00020\u0004X\u0086\u000e¢\u0006\u000e\n\u0000\u001a\u0004\b\u0005\u0010\u0006\"\u0004\b\u0007\u0010\bR\u000e\u0010\t\u001a\u00020\nX\u0082D¢\u0006\u0002\n\u0000¨\u0006\u000f"]
      d2=["LTest;","","()V","name","","getName","()Ljava/lang/String;","setName","(Ljava/lang/String;)V","secret","","greet","","guess","attempt","lib_release"]
    )

There’s a Kotlin annotation containing all of the symbols we were trying to obfuscate away! Kotlin apparently uses this annotation for reflection and for keeping track of various language features that don’t have a direct mapping in Java bytecode (such as members with internal access). Sure enough, switching back to Android Studio and making it “decompile” the Kotlin code into Java shows the annotation:

@Metadata(
   mv = {1, 1, 15},
   bv = {1, 0, 3},
   k = 1,
   d1 = {"\u0000\"\n\u0002\u0018\u0002\n\u0002\u0010\u0000\n\u0002\b\u0002\n\u0002\u0010\u000e\n\u0002\b\u0005\n\u0002\u0010\b\n\u0000\n\u0002\u0010\u0002\n\u0002\b\u0003\u0018\u00002\u00020\u0001B\u0005¢\u0006\u0002\u0010\u0002J\u0006\u0010\u000b\u001a\u00020\fJ\u0010\u0010\r\u001a\u00020\f2\u0006\u0010\u000e\u001a\u00020\nH\u0002R\u001a\u0010\u0003\u001a\u00020\u0004X\u0086\u000e¢\u0006\u000e\n\u0000\u001a\u0004\b\u0005\u0010\u0006\"\u0004\b\u0007\u0010\bR\u000e\u0010\t\u001a\u00020\nX\u0082D¢\u0006\u0002\n\u0000¨\u0006\u000f"},
   d2 = {"LTest;", "", "()V", "name", "", "getName", "()Ljava/lang/String;", "setName", "(Ljava/lang/String;)V", "secret", "", "greet", "", "guess", "attempt", "lib_release"}
)
public final class Test {

Solving the right problem

Now I had an idea of what was happening I was able to find a couple of other reports of people having the same issue. There’s an open feature request for ProGuard to support Kotlin’s metadata annotation but it’s not yet supported.

As this was a library with a fairly straight forward interface I reasoned I could probably get ProGuard to strip out the metadata annotation. If I stopped Kotlin reflection working in the process then that would actually be a small bonus. Unfortunately other people with the same idea had reported back that they were unsuccessful: even when not using the default ProGuard config, somehow the annotations are kept.

Adding a -printconfiguration instruction to my configuration lets me see the full configuration being passed to ProGuard, and the reason for keeping quickly becomes obvious:

-keepattributes *Annotation*,*Annotation*

This appears to be added by the Android build plugin before it invokes ProGuard, and there’s no obvious way to disable it. ProGuard doesn’t offer a way to reverse this instruction, either, but fortunately the build plugin seems to concatenate all of the -keepattribute values together and puts our user-supplied ones first. Adding a negative filter:

-keepattributes !*Annotation*

Results in the following in the printed configuration:

-keepattributes !*Annotation*,*Annotation*,*Annotation*

The negative filter prevents any subsequent filters from matching. Recompiling and looking at the class file again looks a lot more sensible:

import kotlin.io.ConsoleKt;

public final class Test {
   private final int a = 123;
   private String b = "Chris";

   public final void greet() {
      String var1 = "Hi " + this.b + "! Enter a number: ";
      System.out.println(var1);
      String var10000 = ConsoleKt.readLine();
      if (var10000 != null) {
         var1 = var10000;
         int var3 = Integer.parseInt(var1);
         var1 = var3 == 123 ? "Correct!" : "Nope!";
         System.out.println(var1);
      }
   }
}

And that’s the story of how I spent half a day making a one line change.

Shoring up SSHd configuration

2016-10-18T00:00:00Z

I recently came across a useful tool on GitHub called ssh-audit. It’s a small Python script that connects to an SSH server, gathers a bunch of information, and then highlights any problems it has detected. The problems it reports range from potentially weak algorithms right up to know remote code execution vulnerabilities.

This is the kind of output you get when running ssh-audit. In this particular example, I’m looking at GitHub’s SSH server and have filtered the output to just warnings and failures:

Output of ssh-audit pointing at GitHub’s SSH servers

GitHub’s a bit of a special case, as they’re trying to cope with scores of developers pushing code: they can’t disable weaker algorithms without also stopping lots of people being able to use their service. Still, from the output you can see that ssh-audit has spotted a known vulnerability (CVE-2016-076) and has a lot to say about the various types of supported algorithms.

Background: crypto algorithms used by SSH

Establishing an SSH connection is a moderately complex endeavour, and various parts involve the use of a number of different cryptographic algorithms:

The first such algorithm is the key exchange algorithm. This is the process by which the client and the server agree on a shared key that will be used later. Next comes the host-key algorithm; this is how the server proves its identity to the client. Most SSH users will be familiar with warnings like the following:

$ ssh server.example.com
The authenticity of host 'server.example.com (11.22.33.444)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:rPVMho1fhEkJqvgce/8iAl353dX5QkGT9F3uCFndsa.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?

The warning means that the SSH client doesn’t recognise the server’s key, and is asking the user to confirm it. If the key changes later, the SSH client will refuse to connect. In the warning above you can see the algorithm used by the server was ED25519.

Next up is the encryption algorithm, which handles actually encrypting the data sent over the connection. Finally comes the message authentication code algorithm, commonly referred to as ‘mac’. The mac algorithm is effectively responsible for signing each message as a proof that it came from the other party.

Following the recommendations

ssh-audit’s recommendations are pretty easy to follow. It points and shouts at a particular algorithm, and you configure SSHd to not allow it. This is a snippet from my new SSHd config, which gets no complaints from ssh-audit:

HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key

KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com

What’s more interesting is the reasoning behind some of the algorithms removed. The ecdh-sha2-nistp series of key exchange algorithms are subject to a sidechannel attack described in a paper in 2014. Some people are also concerned about the involvement of NIST, and the potential for backdoors. Various other key exchange algorithms use too small a number of bits in the key exchange (e.g. diffie-hellman-group1-sha1, which uses 1024). Others still use known-bad hash algorithms (e.g. diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, which uses an acceptable 2048 bit modulus, but relies on SHA1 hashes). ssh-audit only treats the use of SHA1 as a warning, but there’s no compelling reason to keep it around if you’re using remotely modern clients to connect. Similarly the host-key DSA algorithm uses a 1024 bit key, so should be disabled.

Many of the rejected encryption algorithms use basically-broken algorithms (3des-cbc and arcfour for example). Some of the remaining are block ciphers with small block sizes, which makes them weak (e.g. blockfish-cbc uses a block size of 64 bits).

Many of these concerns also apply to mac algorithms (e.g. eliminating hmac-md5, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, etc, as they use weak hash algos). Of particular note, OpenSSH supports the hmac-ripemd160 and hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com algorithms. RIPEMD160 isn’t that common but, like SHA1, is considered to be weak. One other concern with mac algorithms is the order in which the encryption and mac attachment are performed. Encrypt-then-mac is the preferred way of doing it (i.e., the message is encrypted, then a MAC of the ciphertext is attached). The default used in SSH is encrypt-and-mac, where the mac of the plaintext is attached after encryption. Attaching the plaintext mac potentially leaks information (a mac is designed to provide integrity, not confidentiality, after all). The encrypt-then-mac algorithms are indicated by the -etm suffix.

Other changes

In addition to the ssh-audit inspired changes, I took the time to review the rest of my standard SSH configuration. The config touches on a few areas; I’m only going to highlight a couple of them:

  PubkeyAuthentication yes
  RhostsRSAAuthentication no
  HostbasedAuthentication no
  ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
  PasswordAuthentication no

Here all authentication methods other than public key are disabled. A decent key (used in combination with good crypto algorithms!) is drastically harder to brute force than a very good password. It’s also less prone to accidentally being copied into the wrong place, provided to the wrong server, etc.

- UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
+ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox

Switching UsePrivilegeSeparation from ‘yes’ to ‘sandbox’ tells OpenSSH to employ kernel sandbox mechanisms on the unprivileged process. This adds another layer of defence in case there’s a severe exploit in OpenSSH itself.

An unexpected side effect

After reconfiguring OpenSSH, all of my servers stopped reporting SSH brute force attempts. Every day prior to the change saw hundreds of connections and, after rate limiting and automatic banning blocked a fair chunk, about two dozen unsuccessful login attempts. With the new algorithm selections in place, there were still hundreds of connections, but no failed login attempts at all. A closer look at the logs showed this:

fatal: Unable to negotiate with 1.2.3.4 port 55025:
  no matching key exchange method found. Their offer:
    diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
    diffie-hellman-group1-sha1

Apparently not a single one of the clients trying to bruteforce their way in supported the one key exchange algorithm I now allow. I guess at some point they’ll be updated with a modern crypto stack, but until then it’s going to be oddly peaceful…

Why you should be using HTTPS

2016-06-17T00:00:00Z

The EFF’s HTTPS Everywhere logo

One of my favourite hobbyhorses recently has been the use of HTTPS, or lack thereof. HTTPS is the thing that makes the little padlock appear in your browser, and has existed for over 20 years. In the past, that little padlock was the exclusive preserve of banks and other ‘high security’ establishments; over time its use has gradually expanded to most (but not all) websites that handle user information, and the time is now right for it to become ubiquitous.

Why use HTTPS?

There are numerous advantages to using HTTPS, both for the users of a website and for the operator:

Privacy

The most obvious advantage is that HTTPS gives your users additional privacy. An insecure (HTTP) request can potentially be read by anyone on the same network, or the network operators, or anyone who happens to operate a network along the path between the user and the server.

Users on shared WiFi networks (such as those in coffee shops, hotels, or offices) are particularly vulnerable to passive sniffing by anyone else on that network. If the network is open (as is frequently the case) then anyone in radio range can see exactly what the user is up to.

Integrity

HTTPS also helps to maintain the integrity of your site. With a plain HTTP request, there’s nothing to stop anyone in between the server and the user from modifying the content of the request or the response. This is a frequent tactic used by annoying WiFi gateways (such as the ones you’d find in a hotel), dubious ISPs who want to serve you extra adverts, or just plain old nefarious attackers.

If you’re trying to convey some kind of information to users (and if you aren’t, why exactly are you running a website again?) it seems beneficial to both you and them if the information arrives as you intended, rather than in a modified form due to someone or something tampering with it.

Security

If your website has any kind of authentication, or session identifiers, it becomes extremely vulnerable to an attacker monitoring the traffic and stealing the credentials. This was starkly demonstrated in 2010 when Firesheep was released. This tool allowed anyone to quickly and automatically hijack social media accounts of anyone on the same network who was using HTTP to access them.

Even if your login pages are served over HTTPS, if you send a single session ID cookie over HTTP (such as a page you decided wasn’t particularly ‘important’) then an attacker can probably spoof the user’s session and gain full access to their account. Again, in the case of open WiFi networks that could be anyone in radio range.

Search engine rankings

Some search engines use HTTPS as a signal in their ranking algorithms. Google announced in 2004 that it was using the presence of HTTPS as a small positive signal, but that it may strengthen that signal over time as more and more websites switch to using a secure transport. It’s not unthinkable that at some point in the future there will be HTTPS-only search engines.

But… But… But…

There are lots of excuses for not implementing HTTPS. Most of them are either misguided or outdated.

It’s too expensive and/or complicated

In the past, getting HTTPS certificates was a pain. A number of free suppliers have existed for a while but the process for getting their certificates wasn’t particularly straight forward, and many imposed arbitrary restrictions on the certificate parameters. Even once you had the certificate, you had to fiddle about with your HTTP server configuration to make it work, remember to manually get a new certificate when the old one expired, and lots of other annoying busywork.

With the arrival of Let’s Encrypt, all that changed. You can retrieve and deploy a free HTTPS certificate with two or three commands. Renewal can be handled completely automatically with a single command executed by cron.

There’s no point; nothing on my site is sensitive

You might not think your content warrants privacy, but can you speak for everyone who accesses it? Even content that seems mundane to you — such as travel advice, or technical writing — could be used to build up a profile of a user. If an attacker is monitoring traffic in a coffee shop and sees a user looking at travel advice and weather forecasts for a foreign country, he could use that information to plan a burglary knowing that the user will be away. Similarly, some content which is perfectly mundane to you may actually be very sensitive in other countries with repressive governments. HTTPS makes it much harder for these people to snoop on traffic.

From another angle, if you’re offering any kind of information, instructions, or especially file downloads, there’s a severe risk to users if the content is modified on its way to them. An evil sysadmin could rewrite your travel advice to suggest visiting the local drug dealer’s hangout, or replace your download with a malware-infested version.

HTTPS is slower, uses more resources, etc

Back in 1995 this might have been a valid argument. Enabling HTTPS on a modern server will make an almost negligible difference to performance. If you also enable HTTP/2 (which most implementations only support over HTTPS), it’s likely to actually use fewer resources, and result in a faster, smoother experience for your users. HTTP/2 was designed to work with HTTPS, and designed with modern requirements and networking techniques in mind.

CloudFlare have an excellent demonstration of the benefits of HTTP/2, and it can show speed improvements of 2-3x in a typical environment. On top of being faster, HTTP/2 uses fewer connections which results in less resource overhead on both the server and the client.

So what are you waiting for?

If you run a website and aren’t using HTTPS, give it a try.