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Building a travel toolkit

2025-01-02T00:00:00Z

The container for my toolkit, a UGREEN “travel accessories” bag

For a while now, whenever I’ve traveled anywhere I’ve dumped a selection of tools into my backpack just in case I need them. Originally this was mostly focused around being able to open and fix my laptop if anything went wrong, but over time has slowly expanded to include other useful tools.

Repeatedly packing these tools and then returning them to where they belonged was tedious, though. I couldn’t just leave them in the backpack as I often needed them for non-travelling purposes, and I didn’t want to just buy duplicate tools that spent most of their life a few meters away from each other, so I ignored the problem and just dealt with the tedium.

Eventually I acquired enough tools that — while not quite duplicates — I wouldn’t miss often if they were kept in the backpack. Building on these I’ve created a little travel toolkit that contains everything I might want (and more) while away.

The base

The biggest challenge I had before was finding a screwdriver set. I have an iFixit Mako set that did the in-and-out-of-the-bag routine for several years. Nothing else covered the range of drivers I wanted for generic electronic tinkering and more chunky work. I finally found one in the form of a Wera Tool-Check PLUS TR-Edition. “TR” stands for “Tool Rebel” and is Wera’s “fan club” brand. Its signature features over the normal Tool-Check PLUS are a fancy fabric case and a 152mm bit extender; but it also comes with a much different set of bits, which is why I picked it up.

Here’s a comparison

Type	Standard version	Tool Rebel edition
Phillips	2x PH1 3x PH2 1x PH3	1x PH00 1x PH0 1x PH1 1x PH2 1x PH3
Pozidrive	None	1x PZ1 3x PZ2
Slotted	1x 5.5mm	1x 4mm 1x 4.5mm 2x 5.5mm 1x 6.5mm
Torx	1x T10 1x T15 1x T20 1x T25 1x T30 1x T40	1x T10 1x T15 1x T20 1x T25 1x T30 1x T40
Security Torx	1x T10 1x T15 1x T20 1x T25 1x T30	1x T25
Hex	1x H3 1x H4 1x H5 1x H6 1x H8	1x H1.5 1x H2 1x H2.5 1x H3 1x H4 1x H6 1x H8

There are only five bits present in the standard version that are missing in the TR edition: 5mm hex (pretty uncommon) and four sizes of security torx (rare). In exchange for those and the removal of a bunch of duplicates, you get two extra phillips sizes (0 and 00, both very useful for electronics and spectacles), some pozidrive bits (extremely common on random hardware/furniture/etc), smaller hex bits (for electronics, 3D printers, and so on), and a few other bits and pieces.

Overall it’s a vastly superior selection for my needs. And while it doesn’t have the full range of bits provided by the iFixit kit, it does cover almost everything I’m ever actually likely to need while travelling, and it’s probably around a third of the size.

The other core part of the toolkit is the bag. I had a UGREEN “travel accessory” bag hanging around unused, and noticed it was almost the exact right size for the Tool-Check. Now, how many other tools could I stuff in there?

All the tools

The array of tools that make up the travel toolkit

The kit can be broken down into a few sections:

Screwdriving

The aforementioned Wera Tool-Check
Its 152mm bit extender

I’ve talked enough about this already, I think, so I’ll spare you any additional commentary on screwdrivers and bits.

Splitting, gripping and cutting

Engineer tweezers
Engineer mini snips
Engineer mini screw removal pliers
Knipex mini waterpump pliers
Two iFixit spudgers (one metal, one plastic)
iFixit jimmy

I have bigger or slightly different versions of these that stay in my normal toolkit. The tweezers and snips are useful in a variety of situations, and the spudgers are handy for getting inside laptops and other devices. The pliers are less useful, but they’re one of those things where when you do need them there aren’t any good alternatives.

Sewing

Two needles
Some black thread
Set of mini clips

You never know when you’re going to rip a seam in something. I find the clips a lot less fiddly than using pins for keeping material in place when I’m trying to sew.

Computering

Retractable ethernet cable
RJ45 coupler
USB-C to RJ45 adapter
Dual USB-A and USB-C thumb drive, with an Arch ISO on it

Sometimes Wi-Fi just doesn’t cut it, or you need to fiddle with a router that doesn’t expose its admin UI over Wi-Fi. The USB-C adapter is for use with my phone, as it’s often easier to move that get the laptop where it needs to be.

I can boot from the thumb drive into an Arch environment, and from there reinstall my laptop from scratch if needed. There’s enough space left over so it can be used to transfer files as well.

Miscellaneousing

Fabric tape measure
Spirit level
Sharpie
Superglue
Spare batteries: 2 CR2032s, 2 AA, 2 AAA

I’m almost certain I won’t use the spirit level, but it’s tiny and I had a spare so it went in. Everything else is just in the “generally handy to have” category.

Putting it all together

The nicely-organised side of the toolkit

The Tool-Check PLUS fits almost perfectly into one side of the UGREEN bag, leaving a little wiggle room along the side for the longer parts like spudgers. The middle pockets can’t fit much in, but keep the batteries and sewing bits out of the way. Everything else is in a big zip-up compartment in the other side, which is slightly messy but still easy enough to dig through to find whatever I need.

The complete kit weighs in at around 1.2KG, so it’s not exactly lightweight, but it goes in a bag with a heavy laptop and all of its peripherals so it’s not as noticeable as it might otherwise be.

It remains to be seen how much use I’ll actually get out of any of this. Maybe I’ll put a bit of paper in so that I can track how often I use each tool…

Shoring up SSHd configuration

2016-10-18T00:00:00Z

I recently came across a useful tool on GitHub called ssh-audit. It’s a small Python script that connects to an SSH server, gathers a bunch of information, and then highlights any problems it has detected. The problems it reports range from potentially weak algorithms right up to know remote code execution vulnerabilities.

This is the kind of output you get when running ssh-audit. In this particular example, I’m looking at GitHub’s SSH server and have filtered the output to just warnings and failures:

Output of ssh-audit pointing at GitHub’s SSH servers

GitHub’s a bit of a special case, as they’re trying to cope with scores of developers pushing code: they can’t disable weaker algorithms without also stopping lots of people being able to use their service. Still, from the output you can see that ssh-audit has spotted a known vulnerability (CVE-2016-076) and has a lot to say about the various types of supported algorithms.

Background: crypto algorithms used by SSH

Establishing an SSH connection is a moderately complex endeavour, and various parts involve the use of a number of different cryptographic algorithms:

The first such algorithm is the key exchange algorithm. This is the process by which the client and the server agree on a shared key that will be used later. Next comes the host-key algorithm; this is how the server proves its identity to the client. Most SSH users will be familiar with warnings like the following:

$ ssh server.example.com
The authenticity of host 'server.example.com (11.22.33.444)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:rPVMho1fhEkJqvgce/8iAl353dX5QkGT9F3uCFndsa.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?

The warning means that the SSH client doesn’t recognise the server’s key, and is asking the user to confirm it. If the key changes later, the SSH client will refuse to connect. In the warning above you can see the algorithm used by the server was ED25519.

Next up is the encryption algorithm, which handles actually encrypting the data sent over the connection. Finally comes the message authentication code algorithm, commonly referred to as ‘mac’. The mac algorithm is effectively responsible for signing each message as a proof that it came from the other party.

Following the recommendations

ssh-audit’s recommendations are pretty easy to follow. It points and shouts at a particular algorithm, and you configure SSHd to not allow it. This is a snippet from my new SSHd config, which gets no complaints from ssh-audit:

HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key

KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com

What’s more interesting is the reasoning behind some of the algorithms removed. The ecdh-sha2-nistp series of key exchange algorithms are subject to a sidechannel attack described in a paper in 2014. Some people are also concerned about the involvement of NIST, and the potential for backdoors. Various other key exchange algorithms use too small a number of bits in the key exchange (e.g. diffie-hellman-group1-sha1, which uses 1024). Others still use known-bad hash algorithms (e.g. diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, which uses an acceptable 2048 bit modulus, but relies on SHA1 hashes). ssh-audit only treats the use of SHA1 as a warning, but there’s no compelling reason to keep it around if you’re using remotely modern clients to connect. Similarly the host-key DSA algorithm uses a 1024 bit key, so should be disabled.

Many of the rejected encryption algorithms use basically-broken algorithms (3des-cbc and arcfour for example). Some of the remaining are block ciphers with small block sizes, which makes them weak (e.g. blockfish-cbc uses a block size of 64 bits).

Many of these concerns also apply to mac algorithms (e.g. eliminating hmac-md5, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, etc, as they use weak hash algos). Of particular note, OpenSSH supports the hmac-ripemd160 and hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com algorithms. RIPEMD160 isn’t that common but, like SHA1, is considered to be weak. One other concern with mac algorithms is the order in which the encryption and mac attachment are performed. Encrypt-then-mac is the preferred way of doing it (i.e., the message is encrypted, then a MAC of the ciphertext is attached). The default used in SSH is encrypt-and-mac, where the mac of the plaintext is attached after encryption. Attaching the plaintext mac potentially leaks information (a mac is designed to provide integrity, not confidentiality, after all). The encrypt-then-mac algorithms are indicated by the -etm suffix.

Other changes

In addition to the ssh-audit inspired changes, I took the time to review the rest of my standard SSH configuration. The config touches on a few areas; I’m only going to highlight a couple of them:

  PubkeyAuthentication yes
  RhostsRSAAuthentication no
  HostbasedAuthentication no
  ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
  PasswordAuthentication no

Here all authentication methods other than public key are disabled. A decent key (used in combination with good crypto algorithms!) is drastically harder to brute force than a very good password. It’s also less prone to accidentally being copied into the wrong place, provided to the wrong server, etc.

- UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
+ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox

Switching UsePrivilegeSeparation from ‘yes’ to ‘sandbox’ tells OpenSSH to employ kernel sandbox mechanisms on the unprivileged process. This adds another layer of defence in case there’s a severe exploit in OpenSSH itself.

An unexpected side effect

After reconfiguring OpenSSH, all of my servers stopped reporting SSH brute force attempts. Every day prior to the change saw hundreds of connections and, after rate limiting and automatic banning blocked a fair chunk, about two dozen unsuccessful login attempts. With the new algorithm selections in place, there were still hundreds of connections, but no failed login attempts at all. A closer look at the logs showed this:

fatal: Unable to negotiate with 1.2.3.4 port 55025:
  no matching key exchange method found. Their offer:
    diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
    diffie-hellman-group1-sha1

Apparently not a single one of the clients trying to bruteforce their way in supported the one key exchange algorithm I now allow. I guess at some point they’ll be updated with a modern crypto stack, but until then it’s going to be oddly peaceful…